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Surcharging a Debtor's Exempt Assets Go Too Far?
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INTRODUCTION

American bankruptcy law developed as a means to benefit both
insolvent debtors and their unsatisfied creditors. Since an insolvent
debtor typically owes more to creditors than there are assets for distribution, a bankruptcy proceeding encourages both sides to work together in dividing up the available assets instead of allowing a potentially destructive race to the courthouse.' However, in addition to its
role in overcoming the collective action problem among creditors, the
Bankruptcy Code was enacted in order to provide debtors, unable to
pay their debts, with a "fresh start." This fresh start is accomplished by
distributing estate property to creditors and thereafter relieving the
debtor of any further obligations (referred to as a "discharge" of
debt).2 In order to operate properly, however, bankruptcy proceedings
require the parties to follow the stringent regulations set forth in the
Code; otherwise, the delicate balance between creditors' and debtors'
interests may be disturbed.
The Bankruptcy Code includes important provisions intended to
provide debtors with a suitable standard of living during and after the
bankruptcy proceeding. An individual debtor filing for bankruptcy is
permitted to exempt a number of assets from the bankruptcy estate,
which the creditors may not reach, in order to allow the debtor to bet BA 2007, Emory University; JD Candidate 2010, The University of Chicago Law School.
1

See Thomas H. Jackson, The Logic and Limits of Bankruptcy 9 (Harvard 1986) (compar-

ing the competition among creditors for a debtor's assets to buying tickets for a rock concert,
where the people first in line get the best seats while the people in back may get nothing at all).
2
Thomas Jackson, in discussing the "fresh start" policy in bankruptcy law, explains,
[Aln individual who resorts to bankruptcy can obtain a discharge from most of his existing
debts in exchange for surrendering either his existing nonexempt assets, or more recently, a
portion of his future earnings. Discharge not only releases the debtor from past financial
obligations, but also protects him from some of the adverse consequences that might otherwise result from that release.
Id at 225.
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gin a "fresh start" with an adequate quality of life Once a creditor
accepts a debtor's list of exempt assets, those assets are considered
exempt under the Bankruptcy Code. Sometimes, however, debtors
attempt to retain property that should be distributed to creditors by
improperly concealing or refusing to turn over nonexempt assets that
belong to the bankruptcy estate. If the creditors uncover the assets, the
court will order the debtor to turn them over. However, if the debtor
consumes the nonexempt assets after filing for bankruptcy (in lieu of
using his exempt assets) the creditors may no longer be able to reach
those assets to satisfy their claims. 4 Therefore, the debtor would retain
more property than he is permitted under exemption statutes, but his
creditors would not be able to reach the nonexempt property because
it no longer exists. In these situations, the Code authorizes the court to
impose sanctions on debtors or to provide remedies for the wronged
creditors. For instance, the court may refuse to discharge a debt, issue
an order to turn over property, or even dismiss the case.' One circuit
court and several district courts have additionally allowed courts to
use their equitable powers, granted in 11 USC § 105(a),6 to "surcharge"' a debtor's exempt assets in order to compensate for the nonexempt assets improperly hidden or retained by the debtor.' Creditors
in these cases surcharge, or reach, a debtor's exempt assets and extract
the value of the nonexempt estate property.
The Tenth Circuit recently challenged this approach in In re
Scrivner,9 where the court performed a statutory analysis of the Code
and held that courts may not use their equitable powers to surcharge a
debtor's exempt assets under any circumstances. Scrivner thus created
a split between the Tenth Circuit and other courts, including the Ninth
Circuit, which set forth the prevailing view that bankruptcy courts

See id at 231.
For example, this may occur where a debtor conceals his interest in a corporation and
uses the corporation's assets. See Part II for cases involving this fact pattern.
5 See Part I.D.
6
Section 105 provides a bankruptcy court the power to "issue any order, process or judgment that is necessary to or appropriate to carry out the provisions" of the Bankruptcy Code.
11 USC § 105. For a discussion of 11 USC § 105(a), see Part I.C.
7
According to Black's Law Dictionary, a "surcharge" means: "The amount that a court
may charge a fiduciary that has breached its duty." See In re Hamblen, 354 BR 322 (Bankr ND
Ga 2006) ("In exceptional circumstances, bankruptcy courts have the authority to fashion a
remedy that allows a trustee to surcharge or offset an exemption.") (emphasis added).
8
See Part II.A.
9 535 F3d 1258,1265 (10th Cir 2008) (holding that § 105(a) can only be invoked to further
a substantive provision of the code, and not to help create a new substantive right).
3

4
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may use their equitable powers under § 105(a) to allow creditors to
surcharge a debtor's exempt assets. '0
The main force driving the Scrivner court's decision was its statutory interpretation of the Code coupled with an analysis of the court's
equitable powers." In particular, the court held that § 105(a) may only
be invoked to further a substantive provision of the Code, and allowing creditors to surcharge a debtor's exempt assets exceeds that power
because it is not connected to a substantive provision of the Code. 2 As
the court noted, it is beyond a bankruptcy court's equitable powers to
create a substantive right,'3 and therefore courts may not create a right
that allows creditors to surcharge a debtor's exempt assets." This
Comment argues that Scrivner is correct, and that § 105(a) does not
authorize the power that courts have used to try and repair the perceived injustice of debtors retaining more assets than the law allows.
The courts that have used § 105(a) to surcharge a debtor's exempt
assets do not further a specific provision of the Code, and thus treat
§ 105(a) as a substantive rather than procedural instrument. This extends the court's authority beyond its statutory limit and thus, as the
Scrivner court recognized, should not be permitted.
However, there is another power granted to bankruptcy courts
that allows them to achieve the same outcome without resorting to an
expansion of the court's statutory authority: the court's power to hold
a party in civil contempt. 5 A bankruptcy court may use its civil contempt powers to fashion sanctions that compensate a harmed party,
coerce a party in contempt to comply with the court's orders, or both.
A bankruptcy court's contempt powers are broad discretionary grants
of power that arise regardless of whether the law underlying the court
order stems from bankruptcy law or nonbankruptcy law.16 Unlike
§ 105(a), the court's contempt powers need not be connected to a specific provision of the Bankruptcy Code.
This Comment therefore sets forth a novel approach to situations
where a debtor violates a court order by refusing to disclose or turn
10 See Latman v Burdette, 366 F3d 774,782 (9th Cir 2004).
11 See 535 F3d at 1265.
12 Id.
13 In this Comment, the terms "right" and "remedy" are used interchangeably to refer to
surcharges. This reflects the fact that the Ninth Circuit speaks mostly in terms of remedies while
the Tenth Circuit speaks mostly in terms of rights. Accordingly, the terms are both used throughout this Comment and are not intended to convey different meanings.
14 Scrivner,535 F3d at 1265.
15 Id at 1265 n 3.
16 See Part III.B.2.
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over assets: courts should be able to use their contempt powers to surcharge that debtor's exempt assets. While a court would exceed its
equitable powers under § 105(a) by creating the substantive right to
surcharge a debtor's exempt assets at its discretion, the court may accomplish the same outcome by holding a debtor in contempt of court
by reaching that debtor's exempt assets and retrieving the value of the
improperly retained property. However, this Comment argues that the
power to hold a debtor in contempt should be limited to those circumstances where the debtor's behavior displays a gross deviation
from proper conduct. Specifically, this Comment proposes that the
contempt power should be limited by three minimum requirements. In
order to invoke this power to surcharge, courts should be required to
find that (1) the debtor willfully violated a court order, (2) the debtor
received the full value of his permitted exemptions after filing the
bankruptcy petition, and (3) the creditor is unable to obtain the nonexempt estate property.
Providing courts with this remedy serves several purposes that
coincide with the purposes of the Code. First, and most importantly, it
compensates an aggrieved creditor where other available remedies
are not as helpful. Additionally, it coerces the debtor to comply with
court orders, further deters debtors from fraudulently concealing or
retaining estate property, thus preserving court resources, and provides legitimacy to the bankruptcy process.
This Comment is divided into three Parts. Part I provides a background on bankruptcy proceedings and relevant provisions of the
Code, specifically focusing on exemption laws, a court's equitable
powers, and remedies for fraud in the bankruptcy process. Part II discusses the split in the courts regarding whether a creditor may surcharge a debtor's exempt assets. Part III presents an analysis of the issue and sets forth a solution to the dispute: where a debtor violates a
court order to disclose or turn over estate property, the court should be
able to hold that debtor in contempt of court and surcharge his exempt
assets. Allowing courts to sanction debtors under these circumstances
compensates the creditor and enforces the purposes of the provisions of
the Bankruptcy Code without causing the courts to exceed the limits of
their equitable powers or violate any provisions of the Code.
I. BACKGROUND ON BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS AND THE

BANKRUPTCY CODE

This Part provides a historical background on the Bankruptcy
Code and delves into bankruptcy provisions that are relevant to this
Comment. In particular, it discusses a bankruptcy court's history as an
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equitable court, both bankruptcy and nonbankruptcy exemption laws,
a court's equitable powers pursuant to § 105(a), and various remedies
available to bankruptcy courts where a party perpetuates a fraud during the proceedings.
A. The Origin of the Bankruptcy Code
American bankruptcy courts are "essentially" courts of equity."
The Supreme Court in Pepper v Litton'8 explained the inherent powers

that bankruptcy courts, as courts in equity, are authorized to employ:
"In the exercise of its equitable jurisdiction the bankruptcy court has
the power to sift the circumstances surrounding any claim to see that

injustice or unfairness is not done in administration of the bankrupt
estate." 9 Bankruptcy courts have subsequently applied their inherent

powers to numerous situations in order to administer the bankruptcy
estate and proceedings. 2

Although bankruptcy courts are considered courts in equity, they
are also governed by the Bankruptcy Code and are subject to the limitations of their statutory power.2' Congress is authorized, under the
United States Constitution, to enact laws that govern the administra-

tion and process of a bankruptcy system,2' and Congress has done so
several times. For example, in 1978, Congress passed the Bankruptcy
Reform Act, codified in Title 11 of the United States Code, known as

17 See Pepper v Litton, 308 US 295, 304 (1939) (noting that "a bankruptcy court is a court
of equity at least in the sense that in the exercise of the jurisdiction conferred upon it by the
[Bankruptcy] Act, it applies the principles and rules of equity jurisprudence"); Local Loan Co v
Hunt, 292 US 234, 240 (1934) (claiming that bankruptcy courts are constituted by §§ 1-2 of the
Bankruptcy Act and are invested "with such jurisdiction at law and in equity as will enable them
to exercise original jurisdiction in bankruptcy proceedings").
18 308 US 295 (1939).
19 Id at 308.
20
See Alan N. Resnick and Harry J. Sommer, eds, 2 Collier on Bankruptcy 105.04 at 10558 (Matthew Bender 15th rev ed 2009) ("Courts have used these provisions of section 105 to
resolve issues regarding the ability to detect and punish contempt, to regulate the practice of
lawyers, to administer the assets under its control and the claims related to them, and to monitor
and supervise all bankruptcy estates.").
21 See Barry E. Adler, Douglas G. Baird, and Thomas H. Jackson, Cases, Problems, and
Materials on Bankruptcy 47 (Foundation Press 2007) (explaining that, under 28 USC § 1334 and
28 USC § 157(a), bankruptcy courts are mere adjuncts of the district courts and therefore do not
exercise independent judicial power).
22 US Const Art I, § 8, cl 4 ("The Congress shall have the power to... establish ... uniform
laws on the subject of bankruptcies throughout the United States").
23 See Jackson, Logic and Limits at 1 (cited in note 1) (describing the history of bankruptcy
law in the United States, from the constant enactments and repeals of bankruptcy statutes in the
1800s to the evolution of the more stable Bankruptcy Code in 1978).
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the Bankruptcy Code." United States bankruptcy courts are district
courts in the federal system, and the courts employ both federal and
state laws. While the Bankruptcy Code governs the bankruptcy procedure, state laws are often applied to various aspects of the process, and
these state laws are nonbankruptcy law."
There are two main purposes of the Bankruptcy Code. First, the
Code purports to provide individual debtors with a fresh start, so they
may live their lives free of debt following the bankruptcy proceedings.)
Courts achieve this by first dividing a debtor's existing nonexempt assets (the estate property) between his creditors, and then by granting
the debtor a discharge of any remaining debt.2 Upon discharge, the
debtor is released from his prior obligations to the debtor and is able to
begin his life with a fresh start. In addition, the Code is designed to facilitate orderly debt collection. It equitably distributes a debtor's assets
in order to pay creditors as much of the debt owed to them as possible.
This process thereby prevents creditors from racing to the courthouse
and incurring additional costs (such as continuous oversight of the debtor and separate litigation). Therefore, the overriding purpose of the
bankruptcy system is to benefit both debtors and creditors by (1) discharging the debtor's remaining debts so he may proceed in his life without overwhelming monetary obligations, and (2) providing creditors with
some of the debt owed to them by an insolvent debtor." In order to
achieve these two goals, the Code provides courts with the authority to
strictly regulate the process so as to prevent abuse of the system.
B.

Exemption Laws

Individual debtors filing for bankruptcy are permitted to exempt
a number of assets from their estate and thus prevent creditors from

See Douglas G. Baird, Elements of Bankruptcy 6 (Foundation Press 2006).
Seeid at 5.
26 See Marramav Citizens Bank of Massachusetts,549 US 365,367 (2007); Local Loan Co,
292 US at 244.
27 See Michelle J. White, Why It Pays to File for Bankruptcy: A Critical Look at the Incentives under US. Bankruptcy Law and a Proposalfor Change, 65 U Chi L Rev 685,687-88 (1998).
28 See Jackson, Logic and Limits at 3 (cited in note 1) ("Bankruptcy law, at its core, is debtcollection law.").
29
See id at 4 (noting that the dual concerns of bankruptcy must also be balanced with
other considerations, including the notion of open access to credit markets).
30
See, for example, 11 USC § 522 (governing the procedures required to exempt property),
11 USC § 541 (defining the property of the estate), 11 USC § 547 (allowing courts to set aside
preferences), 11 USC § 727 (regarding discharge of debt).
24
25
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reaching the assets.' In the Bankruptcy Code, 11 USC § 522 governs
the process of exempting property from the bankruptcy estate." The
justification for allowing debtors to retain a certain amount of property is based on providing that debtor with a fresh start following the
bankruptcy proceeding.33 When Congress enacted § 522, it noted that
"[t]he historical purpose of these exemption laws has been to protect
a debtor from his creditors, to provide him with the basic necessities of
life so that even if his creditors levy on all of his nonexempt property,
the debtor will not be left destitute and a public charge."" Therefore,
exemption statutes are protective measures that Congress intended
both for an individual debtor's benefit as well as for the public good.
Exemption statutes vary greatly across states and between the federal-state level, and the scope of a debtor's permitted exemptions often
depends on the governing law. Depending on the applicable law, debtors are frequently able to exempt their homestead, automobile, and
certain personal assets. Under federal law, for example, § 522(d) provides that debtors may exempt, up to a specified amount, their interest
in real property used as a residence, a motor vehicle, household furnishings, jewelry, medical equipment and supplies, certain insurance policies,
and more. Additionally, the federal bankruptcy exemption laws provide debtors with a "wild card" exemption- a stipulated value of assets
that debtors may exempt from their estate." But § 522 also enumerates
specific exceptions stipulating assets that debtors may not exempt. For
example, § 522(c) identifies certain debts that may not be exempted and
§ 522(k) identifies administrative payments that may not be exempted. 7
However, state law, as opposed to federal law, often determines
the scope of a debtor's exempt property. The Bankruptcy Code contains
a federal alternative whereby debtors are permitted to choose whether
they will follow the federal exemptions listed in the Code, pursuant to
31 See Resnick and Sommer, 4 Collier on Bankruptcy
5.22.01 at 522-16-16.1 (cited in
note 20) (noting that the Bankruptcy Code both provides the debtor with a list of exemptions
and allows him to take advantage of more liberal state exemptions, if applicable).
32 11 USC § 522.
33 See In re Gould, 389 BR 105,113 (Bankr ND Cal 2008).
34 HR Rep No 95-595,95th Cong, 1st Sess 126 (1977), reprinted in 1978 USCCAN 5963,6087.

35 See generally 11 USC § 522(d). Section 522 is the lengthy statute that specifically enumerates what can be counted as an exempt asset in bankruptcy proceedings. It also includes rules
for determining exempt assets and even lists assets that cannot be considered exempt, being so
specific as even to note that artworks are not exempt, unless they are of or by the debtor or a
relative. 11 USC § 522 (f)(4)(B)(i).
36 See 11 USC § 522(d)(5).
37 11 USC § 522(c); 11 USC § 522(k) (listing, for example, debts secured by tax liens and
administrative expenses of avoiding a transfer as nonexempt).

The University of Chicago Law Review

1754

[76:1747

§522(d), or their state exemption rules.M Most states, though, have
opted out of the federal alternative, pursuant to 11 USC § 522(b)(1),39

and instead put forth their own laws governing exemptions.40 In these

states, debtors are required to follow the state exemption laws and the

non-Code federal exemption laws." It is important to note that state
exemption laws, while they may apply to bankruptcy proceedings, are in
fact nonbankruptcy exemption laws-they prevent creditors
from
2
reaching those assets both inside and outside of bankruptcy.
In order to exempt property, debtors are required to file a list of
exempt property pursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 4003(a). 3 Section 522(1) stipulates that if a debtor files an exemption list, and a party in interest fails to file a timely objection to that
list, the listed property is considered exempt from the bankruptcy es-

tate and creditors are not able to subsequently reach that property. In
Taylor v Freeland & Kronz, 5 the Supreme Court interpreted § 522(1)

strictly and held that listed property is exempt if the creditor failed to
object in time.4'6 However, the Court predicated its strict interpretation
of § 522(1) on the fact that the exemptions were claimed in good
faith." The Taylor Court then chose not to address whether courts may
use their powers under § 105(a), discussed in Part I.C," to disallow
exemptions not claimed in goud faith. 9 The court did note, though,

11 USC § 522(b)(2).
This section of the Code provides, in relevant part, "An individual debtor may exempt
from property of the estate the property listed in either paragraph (2) or, in the alternative,
paragraph (3) of this subsection." 11 USC §522(b)(1).
40 See Resnick and Sommer, 4 Collier on Bankruptcy T 5.22.01 at 522-16-16.1 (cited in
note 20) (noting that § 522 allows state legislatures to veto some federal asset exemptions).
38
39

41

See id.

See Richard F Dole, Jr, PreservingRights in a Home through Bankruptcy, 4 Bank Dev J
1 n 15 (1987).
43 Resnick and Sommer, 4 Collieron Bankruptcy 5.22.02[3] at 522-20-21 (cited in note 20).
44 The section of the Code governing exemptions provides, in relevant part,
42

The debtor shall file a list of property that the debtor claims as exempt under subsection (b) of
this section. If the debtor does not file such a list, a dependent of the debtor may file such a
list, or may claim property as exempt from property of the estate on behalf of the debtor. Unless a party in interest objects, the property claimed as exempt on such list is exempt.
11 USC § 522(1).
45

503 US 638 (1992).

Id at 643-44 ("Deadlines may lead to unwelcome results, but they prompt parties to act
and they produce finality.").
46

47
48
49

See id at 645.
See Part I.C.
See 503 US at 645.
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that the Code "may limit bad-faith exemptions claimed by debtors,"
and it cited several courts that have held accordingly."'
C.

A Court's Equitable Powers under § 105(a)

Section 105(a) of the Bankruptcy Code is a statutory grant of
equitable powers to bankruptcy courts. The provision states:
The court may issue any order,process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title. No
provision of this title providing for the raising of an issue by a
party in interest shall be construed to preclude the court from,
sua sponte, taking any action or making any determination necessary or appropriate to enforce or implement court orders or
rules, or to prevent an abuse of process. 1
The purpose of § 105(a) is to enable bankruptcy courts to use equitable powers to carry out other provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. 2 As
§ 105(a) jurisprudence indicates, courts are limited in their use of
these powers because the courts must derive their power to use
§ 105(a) from another provision in the Code. 3
The history of § 105(a) illustrates why courts may only Use this
equitable grant of powers to further specific provisions in the Code.
The predecessor statute to § 105(a) was § 2a(15) of the Bankruptcy
Act. - Section 2a(15) provided bankruptcy courts with the authority to
"make such orders, issue such process, and enter such judgments in
addition to those specifically provided for, as may be necessary for the
enforcement of the provisions of this Act."" The language of § 105(a)
provides courts with more power than the predecessor § 2a(15), as it
authorizes courts not only to issue orders that are "necessary" for the
50 Id at 644-45, citing for example, Ragsdale v Genesco, Inc, 674 F2d 277,278 (4th Cir 1982)
(allowing the bankruptcy judge to determine whether the trustee may object to the debtor's filed
exemption list in an untimely fashion); In re Staniforth, 116 BR 127, 131 (Bankr WD Wis 1990)
("[Flor the Debtor to receive an exemption for property which may not be exempt under Wisconsin law simply because the trustee failed to timely object to the Debtor's exemption would be
a manifest miscarriage of justice.").
51 11 USC § 105(a) (emphasis added).
52
See Scrivner, 535 F3d at 1263.
53 See, for example, id at 1265; United States v Sutton, 786 F2d 1305, 1308 (5th Cir 1986)
(noting that § 105(a) "does not authorize the bankruptcy courts to create substantive rights that
are otherwise unavailable under applicable law, or constitute a roving commission to do equity").
54 See Resnick and Sommer, 2 Collier on Bankruptcy $ 105.LH[1] at 105-106 (cited in
note 20) ("Section 2a(15) was viewed by most courts as an express sanction of the mandate of
the bankruptcy court's power to enjoin actions of partie&").
55 Id.
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provisions of the title, but also to issue orders "appropriate" to carry
out the provisions." However, this power is not unlimited.
Judges and academics have compared a bankruptcy court's equitable powers under § 105(a) to the All Writs Statute, 28 USC § 1651,
which authorized courts to "issue all writs necessary or appropriate in
aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and
principles of law."57 Unlike § 105(a), the All Writs Statute did not require courts to derive their power from another statutory provision."
In 1978, Congress enacted a new Bankruptcy Reform Act, and it included bankruptcy courts within the scope of the All Writs Statute pursuant to § 213."9 Congress additionally created § 105(a) with this Actwhich did limit the court's powers to those that further the provisions of
the Code--as a continuation of the All Writs Statute. ° By enacting
§ 105(a), Congress intended to expand a bankruptcy court's powers by
stipulating that § 105(a) was also meant "to cover any powers traditionally eitercised by the bankruptcy courts that are not encompassed by
the All Writs Statute."61 In 1984, however, Congress repealed § 213 of
the Bankruptcy Code; bankruptcy courts were thus left with only
§ 105(a) and its requirement that courts only use the powers in relation
to the Code." Therefore, courts are now required to use their equitable
pwes-only to further a specific provision of the Bankruptcy Code."
. ,There are two main schools of thought regarding a bankruptcy
court's equitable powers under § 105(a)." The prevailing view is that
§ 105(a) is a very broad grant of power to bankruptcy courts, and it
grhnts the courts the authority to fill in gaps that the statutory language
does not address." For example, in 2001 the court in Sears,Roebuck &

56

See Resnick and Sommer, 2 Collier on Bankruptcy I 105.LH[2] at 105-106-107 (cited in

note 20).
57 Id. See, for example, In re NWFX, Inc, 864 F2d 593, 595 (8th Cir 1989) (explaining that
§ 105(a) is comparable to the All Writs Statute); In re Spectee Group, Inc, 185 BR 146, 155 n 15
(Bankr SDNY 1995) (noting that § 105(a) is the "bankruptcy analogue" to the All Writs Statute);
Frederick Tung, Confirmation and Claims Trading,90 Nw U L Rev 1684, 1741 (stating that the
grant of power found in § 105(a) is "similar to that found in the All Writs Statute").
58 Resnick and Sommer, 2 Collier on Bankruptcy I 105.LH[2] at 105-106-107 (cited in note 20).
59

Id.

60

Id.
Id.
62 See Resnick and Sommer, 2 Collier on Bankruptcy I 105.LH[3] at 105-107 (cited in note 20)
(explaining that this repeal came as a result of the Supreme Court's decision in Northern Pipeline
ConstructionCo v Marathon Pipe Line Construction Co, 458 US 50 (1982)).
61

63

See id.

64

Resnick and Sommer, 2 Collier on Bankruptcy

65

See id.

105.01[2] at 105-7 (cited in note 20).
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Co v Spivey6 stated that § 105(a) "bestows on bankruptcy courts a specific equitable power to act in accordance with principles of justice and
fairness. Bankruptcy courts have broad latitude in exercising this power."67 However, the second school of thought-that § 105(a) is not a
broad grant of power to the courts and that it should be construed narrowly-recently has emerged in both the judicial sector and the academic community.6 Three years after Sears,Roebuck & Co, the Seventh
Circuit in the hallmark case of In re Kmart emphasized that the power

of § 105(a) is a power "to implement rather than override" and that
"[t]he fact that a [bankruptcy] proceeding is equitable does not give the
judge a free-floating discretion to redistribute rights in accordance with

his personal views of justice and fairness, however enlightened those

views may be."70 Both approaches, however, recognize that courts are

limited in their use of equitable powers and may not use § 105(a) to
create substantive rights or to override explicit mandates in the Code."
D.

Remedies for Fraud in the Bankruptcy Process

There are several remedies available to bankruptcy courts if a
debtor fails to comply with a court's order to disclose or turn over

property. First, courts may issue an order to turnover property pursuant to 11 USC § 542" or an order to avoid transfer of property under 11 USC § 548." Second, pursuant to 11 USC § 522(g), courts may
66

265 BR 357 (EDNY 2001).

67

Idat371.

See, for example, Scrivner, 535 F3d at 1263 (emphasizing that courts may not use their
equitable powers to contravene other provisions of the Bankruptcy Code).
69
359 F3d 866 (7th Cir 2004).
70
Id at 871, quoting In re Chicago,Milwaukee, St Paul & Pacific RR, 791 F2d 524,528 (7th Cir
1986).
71
See Resnick and Sommer, 2 Collier on Bankruptcy 105.01[2] at 105-7-8 (cited in note 20).
72
The section of the Code governing turnover of property to the estate provides, in relevant part,
68

An entity, other than a custodian, in possession, custody, or control, during the case, of
property that the trustee may use, sell or lease ... or that the debtor may exempt ... shall
deliver to the trustee, and account for, such property or the value of such property, unless
such property is of inconsequential value or benefit to the estate.
11 USC § 542(a).
73 The voidable transfer statute reads, in relevant part,
The trustee may avoid any transfer ... of an interest of the debtor in property, or any obligation ... incurred by the debtor, that was made or incurred on or within 2 years before the
date of the filing of the petition, if the debtor voluntarily or involuntarily ... made such
transfer or incurred such obligation with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any entity
to which the debtor was or became, on or after the date that such transfer was made or such
obligation was incurred, indebted.
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issue a denial of exemptions in the case of voluntary transfers or concealed assets recovered by the trustee." Third, courts may also dismiss

a case "for cause" or for "substantial abuse" pursuant to
11 USC § 707."' Fourth, bankruptcy courts are authorized under
11 USC §727(a) to deny a debtor's discharge. 6 This is a powerful
sword that courts can use to punish debtors who abuse the bankruptcy
process and waste the courts' resources. Courts are in agreement that
denying a debtor's discharge is a punitive sanction against the debtor
rather than a remedial measure to compensate the creditor.7
Finally, in addition to these other statutory powers, bankruptcy
courts may impose civil or criminal contempt on a party for violating a
court order.71 Civil contempt proceedings differ from criminal contempt proceedings based on the purpose of the sanction. Civil contempt proceedings are a remedial measure for the sake of a harmed

11 USC § 548(a)(1).
74

The section of the Code governing exemptions provides, in relevant part,

The debtor may exempt under subsection (b) of this section property that the trustee recovers under section 510(c)(2), 542, 543, 550, 551, or 553 of this title, to the extent that the
debtor could have exempted such property under subsection (b) of this section if such
property had not been transferred, if (1) (A) such transfer was not a voluntary transfer of
such property by the debtor; and (B) the debtor did not conceal such property; or (2) The
debtor could have avoided such transfer under subsection (f)(1)(B) of this section.
11 USC § 522(g).
75
The section of the Code governing case dismissals provides, in relevant part,
After notice and a hearing, the court, on its own motion or on a motion by the United
States trustee, trustee (or bankruptcy administrator, if any), or any party in interest, may
dismiss a case filed by an individual debtor under this chapter whose debts are primarily
consumer debts, or, with the debtor's consent, convert such a case to a case under chapter
11 or 13 of this title if it finds that the granting of relief would be an abuse of the provisions
of this chapter.
11 USC § 707(b)(1).
76
The section of the Code governing discharge provides, in relevant part,
The court shall grant the debtor a discharge, unless ...(2) the debtor, with intent to hinder,
delay, or defraud a creditor or an officer of the estate charged with custody of property under this title, has transferred, removed, destroyed, mutilated, or concealed, or has permitted
to be transferred, removed, destroyed, mutilated, or concealed (A) property of the debtor
...
or (B) property of the estate, after the date of the filing of the petition; (6) the debtor
has refused, in the case (A) to obey any lawful order of the court.
11 USC § 727(a).
77 See Latman v Burdette, 366 F3d 774, 782 (9th Cir 2004) ("The remedy of denial of discharge punishes debtors for misconduct in the bankruptcy process."); In re Roosevelt, 87 F3d 311,
317 n 12 (9th Cir 1996), amended by 98 F3d 1169 (9th Cir 1996).
78 See Jove Engineering, Inc v IRS, 92 F3d 1539, 1553 (11th Cir 1996) (explaining that all
courts (including bankruptcy courts) have inherent powers to punish for contempts).
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party." As the Supreme Court noted, "Sanctions in civil contempt proceedings may ... be employed for either or both of two purposes: to

coerce the defendant into compliance with the court's order, and to
compensate the complainant for losses sustained."' Alternatively, sanctions in criminal contempt proceedings are punitive in nature and are
intended to reprimand a party in violation of an order on behalf of the
court. " These contempt powers are discussed more fully in Part III.B.
II. ANALYSIS OF THE LAW

There is currently a split between circuit courts regarding whether
bankruptcy courts may use their equitable powers, granted by § 105(a),
to surcharge a debtor's exempt assets where that debtor failed to disclose or turn over nonexempt property. While the majority of the district and bankruptcy courts to address this question have held that
bankruptcy courts may surcharge a debtor's exempt assets for equitable purposes, the only two circuit courts to confront the issue reached
divergent conclusions. Additionally, the Supreme Court has never
ruled on whether bankruptcy courts are authorized to surcharge a
debtor's exempt assets.
A. Courts That Allow Creditors to Surcharge a Debtor's Exempt
Assets
Until recently, the leading decision regarding whether a court
may allow a surcharge on a debtor's exempt assets was set forth by the
Ninth Circuit in Latman v Burdette. In Latman, the court held that, in
exceptional circumstances, a court may use its equitable powers to
surcharge a debtor's exempt assets after that debtor failed to disclose
property to his creditors." The trustee in the case filed a motion to
surcharge the debtors' exemptions after discovering that the debtors
failed to accurately account for $7,000 in cash that they received for
selling their automobile and boat immediately before filing a bankruptcy petition." On the debtors' accounting sheet, they listed only

79 See Local 28, Sheet Metal Workers' InternationalAssociation v EEOC, 478 US 421, 443
(1986) (affirming civil contempt sanctions on a fund that violated earlier court orders to increase

minority membership).
82

United States v United Mine Workers ofAmerica, 330 US 258,303-04 (1947).
See Local 28,478 US at 443.
366 F3d 774 (9th Cir 2004).

83

Id at 780.

84

Id at 779.

80
81
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$1,500 in cash on hand." As the trustee was not able to obtain the
proceeds from these sales (the debtors claimed they no longer had the
cash), the motion asserted that the $7,000 should be surcharged against
the debtors' wild card exemption, governed by 11 USC § 522(d)(5). 1 At
the time the debtors filed for bankruptcy, the wild card exemption allowed them to exempt up to $17,850 in property not covered by other
§ 522(d) exemptions, so long as they did not claim a homestead exemption.' Surcharging assets from the wild card exemption would have
rendered the debtors' minivan and engagement ring nonexempt, rather than exempt-as the debtors claimed-under § 522(d)(5)." Additionally, after filing the motion to surcharge, the trustee discovered
another bank account that the debtors failed to disclose.89 The trustee
then filed a motion to either force the debtors to turn over the cash in
the bank account to the trustee, or alternatively to further surcharge
the debtors' exempt assets, which were filed under the wild card exemption, for that same amount."
The debtors in Latman argued that the court exceeded its equitable powers under § 105(a) by allowing the trustee to surcharge the
debtors' exempt assets." They claimed that the Code is silent regarding a surcharge remedy and that allowing a surcharge of exemptions is
inconsistent with providing debtors with a fresh start.9 However, the
Ninth Circuit upheld the bankruptcy court's surcharge because "the
bankruptcy judge prevented what would otherwise have been a fraud
on the bankruptcy court and the Latmans' creditors."" The surcharge
did not cause the debtors to receive a lower value of assets than was
permitted by § 522; the surcharge merely prevented the debtors from
retaining more assets than permitted under the exemption statute.9 If
the court did not allow a surcharge in this case, the debtors would
have been able to obtain the full value of the exemption statute plus
the improperly retained assets, thus exceeding the limit of their statu-

85

Id.

86 Latman, 366 F3d at 779. See note 36 and accompanying text.
8

Idat 779n 1.
Id at 779.

89

Id.

87

90 Latman, 366 F3d at 779.
Id at 784-85.
92 Id at 785.
91
93
94

Id (emphasis added).
Latman, 366 F3d at 785.
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tory exemptions. 5 Therefore, the surcharge was not inconsistent with
the Code's purpose of providing debtors with a fresh start.'
The Ninth Circuit, however, did not provide courts within its jurisdiction with a blanket allowance to issue surcharges. It limited the
use of the remedy to exceptional circumstances where it would "be
the only means fairly to ensure that the debtors retain their statutory
'fresh start,' while also permitting creditors access to property in
excess of that which is properly exempted under the Bankruptcy
Code."9 The court noted that such a situation might arise where other
remedies, such as a turnover order, would be futile because assets
withheld from the trustee were either lost or converted for personal
benefit by the debtor. In line with Latman, numerous bankruptcy
courts both within the Ninth Circuit and in other circuits have also
allowed creditors to surcharge a debtor's exempt assets.9
B.

Courts That Do Not Allow Creditors to Surcharge Exempt Assets
Recently, the Tenth Circuit in Scrivner created a split in the courts
and held that § 105(a) does not authorize courts to use their equitable
powers to surcharge a debtor's exempt assets as a remedy for failing
to disclose or turn over nonexempt property. ' In Scrivner, the debtors
failed to surrender postpetition distributions from their interest in a
television show, thus violating a court order to turn over the
proceeds.10' However, since the court had already ordered a discharge
of their debt, the debtors refused to turn over the proceeds and
claimed that the court could not compel them to do so. ' The trustee
then filed a motion asking the court to surcharge the debtors' exempt
assets, which the bankruptcy court granted." ' On appeal, the Tenth
Circuit reversed the bankruptcy court's order."'
The Tenth Circuit reached its conclusion by performing a statutory analysis of the issue. It noted that bankruptcy courts may not use
95 Id.
96 Id.

97 Id at 786.
98 See Latman, 366 F3d at 785 n 8 (acknowledging that the Code does not explicitly provide
for a remedy of surcharge against a debtor's exemptions in the case of an underreporting of assets).
99 See generally, for example, In re Ross-Tucker, 2005 WL 3263932 (Bankr DDC); Karl v
Karl,313 BR 827 (Bankr WD Mo 2004); In re Ward,210 BR 531 (Bankr ED Va 1997).
100535 F3d at 1265.
101 Id at 1262.
102 Id.
103 Id.

104535 F3d at 1267.
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their equitable powers in a way that is inconsistent with the rest of the
Bankruptcy Code, and this includes disregarding the plain language of a
statute.'05 The general rule from §522(1) of the Bankruptcy Code is that
property is exempt if a debtor claims it as exempt and the creditor fails
to object to the claim in a timely manner.'' The court noted that the
Code specifically enumerates exceptions to this general rule, but it never authorizes a court to surcharge a debtor's exempt assets.'07 The court
therefore held that "[b]ecause the Code contains explicit exceptions to
the general rule placing exempt property beyond the reach of the estate, we may not read additional exceptions into the statute."'O'
Additionally, the court identified specific remedies stipulated in
the Code for a creditor when a debtor fails to turn over estate property to the trustee, and it emphasized the fact that surcharging a debtor's
exempted assets is not a named remedy.' The court explained that
''we are not at liberty 'to grant any more or less than what the clear
language of [the Bankruptcy Code] mandates.' 0 For instance, the
court pointed to revoking the debtor's discharge, authorized by
§727(d)(3), and imposing sanctions for civil contempt as possible remedies within the Code."' It recognized that the Bankruptcy Code's equitable powers provision "does not authorize the bankruptcy courts to create
law." 2
substantive rights that are otherwise unavailable under applicable
Although the Tenth Circuit split from other courts in Scrivner, it
is important to note that the court did not do so enthusiastically. Rather, the court recognized that
the arguments supporting a surcharge of exempt assets are compelling .... Allowing the debtors to keep the full value of their

exempt assets, when they have kept or converted assets belonging to the estate, arguably gives the debtors an undeserved benefit at the expense of the estate and the creditors."'

105

Id at 1263.

106 Id at 1264.
108

Id (referring to §§ 522 (c), (k)).
Scrivner, 535 F3d at 1264.

109

Id.

107

110Id, quoting In re Alderete, 412 F3d 1200, 1206 (10th Cir 2005).
111 Scrivner, 535 F3d at 1265 (suggesting that denial of discharge of debt, rather than surcharge through § 105(a), is the appropriate way for courts to incentivize correct debtor behavior
and protect creditors).
112 Id, quoting United States v Sutton, 786 F2d 1305, 1308 (5th Cir 1986).
113 Scrivner, 535 F3d at 1264.
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However, the court noted that it was the legislature's responsibility to
modify the law, not the judiciary's."' Thus, the Tenth Circuit held that
§ 105(a) does not empower courts to create rights and remedies in
derogation of the Code, and since the Code does not provide creditors
with a right to surcharge
exempt assets, § 105(a) does not provide the
11 5
courts with this right.
Recently, in In re Mazon"6 a district court in the Eleventh Circuit
also confronted the issue of whether a bankruptcy court may use its
equitable powers to surcharge a debtor's exempt assets, reaching the
same conclusion as the Scrivner court."7 In Mazon, the debtors failed
to account for their interest in two companies, which, once discovered,
the court found to be estate property."8 However, while the companies
were extremely valuable to the estate at the time the debtors filed for
bankruptcy, the debtors subsequently used and dissipated nearly all of
the companies' assets to furnish their lifestyle in lieu of using their
exempt assets. "9 The trustee asked the court to surcharge the debtors'
exempt assets in order to acquire the value of the estate property that
he would have received had the debtors not concealed and used up
the companies' assets.' 20 The bankruptcy court granted the motion but
the district court reversed the ruling; like the Scrivner court, it based
its reasoning on a statutory analysis of the Bankruptcy Code. 2'
In short, there is a fundamental disagreement about whether the
equitable power enshrined by § 105(a) allows a court to surcharge a
debtor's exempt assets where the debtor has committed fraud on the
bankruptcy court. The next Part discusses the relative merits of these
arguments and contends that § 105(a) should not be interpreted to
allow courts to surcharge exempt assets. However, it also proposes an
alternative method of accomplishing the same result: through the
courts' contempt powers.

114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121

Id at 1263.
Id at 1265.
395 BR 742 (MD Fla 2008).
Id at 744.
Id at 745.
Id at 746.
Mazon, 395 BR at 746.
Id at 750.
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III. SOLUTION: RECOGNIZING THE LIMITS OF § 105(A) AND THE
POWER OF CONTEMPT

This Part analyzes the current split in the courts and puts forth a
novel solution. Part III.A first argues that Scrivner is correct and that
courts do in fact exceed their equitable powers by creating a substantive right to surcharge a debtor's exempt assets. Part III.B then discusses the broad grant of powers available to courts when sanctioning
a party in contempt. Finally, Part III.C applies the court's contempt
powers to cases where a debtor fraudulently retains estate property. It
argues that courts should be able to use their contempt powers to
sanction a debtor by reaching his exempt assets, provided it is appropriate under the circumstances. This equitable approach allows courts
to compensate the harmed creditors without exceeding their authority.
A. It Is Beyond a Court's Equitable Power to Create a Substantive
Right to Surcharge a Debtor's Exempt Assets
1. It is beyond the bankruptcy court's inherent powers as a court
in equity to create a substantive right or remedy to surcharge.
Bankruptcy courts historically have been granted the same powers as courts in equity.'2 The Judiciary Act of 1789 granted jurisdiction
to all federal courts for "all suits ... in equity," and the Supreme Court
held that "the 'jurisdiction' thus conferred ...is an authority to administer in equity suits the principles of the system of judicial remedies
which has been devised and was being administered by the English
Court of Chancery at the time of the separation of the two countries... However, this power does not equate with the ability to create
new rights for creditors or powers for the court.
This theory of the limited powers of the bankruptcy court was recently upheld by the Supreme Court in Grupo Mexicano De Desarrollo v Alliance Bond Fund, Inc,'24 where the Court performed an indepth analysis of a court's power in equity and held that a court may
not use its equitable powers to invoke a new form of relief.'2' Specifically, the Court held that the bankruptcy court lacked the authority to
issue a preliminary injunction that would prevent a note issuer from

122 See Pepper v Litton, 308 US 295,303 (1939); Part I.A.
123 Atlas Life InsuranceCo v W. I. Southern Inc, 306 US 563,568 (1939).
124

527 US 308 (1999).

125 See id at 319-23.
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disposing of the note holder's assets. It reasoned that because courts
of equity traditionally did not accord this type of relief, the bankruptcy
court lacked the inherent equitable power to create the remedy." The
Court cited William Blackstone to support its contention that courts

lack the power to use equity to create a remedy whenever a remedy at
law is inadequate. ' While the Court recognized that "equity is flexible," it also noted that the "flexibility is confined within the broad
boundaries of traditional equitable relief. To accord a type of relief
that has never been available before ... is to invoke a 'default rule' ...

not of flexibility but of omnipotence."12 ' Instead, as the Court recognized, it is the legislature's duty, rather than the judiciary's, to design
an alternative remedy.12

Therefore, based on this recent Supreme Court case, in order to
determine whether a bankruptcy court may use its inherent powers as

a court in equity to issue a surcharge remedy, the court must determine whether courts of equity traditionally permitted the requested

relief. ' In addition, as the court in Mazon noted, courts in equity were
not permitted to surcharge a debtor's exempt assets to compensate
creditors who were unable to obtain the debtor's nonexempt assets.M
Accordingly, bankruptcy courts may not base their right to surcharge
on their inherent equitable powers.
2. It is beyond a court's statutory equitable powers under
§ 105(a) to create a substantive right to surcharge.
It is widely recognized that it is beyond a court's power to use
§ 105(a) to create a new substantive right or remedy."' In particular,
126

Id at 333.

Id (basing its reasoning on limitations in equity against injunctions that would interfere
with property use).
128 See 527 US at 321, quoting Joseph Story, 1 Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence§ 12
at 14-15 (Hilliard, Gray 1836) (noting that Blackstone once remarked "that it is the business of a
Court of Equity, in England, to abate the rigor of the common law. But no such power is contended for. Hard was the case of bond creditors ....
But a Court of Equity can give no relief.").
129 Grupo Mexicano, 527 US at 322.
130 Id (explaining that Congress is better suited to analyze "new conditions that might call
for a wrenching departure from past practice").
131 See id at 339-40 (noting that the judicial creation of remedies could disrupt the balance
between debtors' and creditors' rights that had developed over centuries).
132 See 395 BR at 750 ("[T]hat the inherent powers of a bankruptcy court provide no greater authority in the context of this case than does § 105(a) and do not allow the imposition of a
surcharge on exempt assets."). The court based its conclusion on the fact that there is no appellate decision that provides precedent suggesting that it is within a court's inherent powers to
surcharge a debtor's exempt assets. Id.
127

133

See Part I.C.
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courts may only issue orders that are "necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions" of the Code.' The Scrivner and Mazon courts

were therefore correct in holding that it is beyond a bankruptcy
court's equitable powers to create a discretionary right to surcharge a
debtor's exempt assets.' Allowing courts to use § 105(a) to surcharge
a debtor's exempt assets expands the Code's equitable powers too far,

and this is evidenced by the fact that the courts that have used
§ 105(a) to surcharge a debtor's exempt assets have based their entire
power on the purpose of doing so, rather than asserting that it fulfills a
substantive provision of the Code. 6 For example, the Latman court

based its holding on the fact that authorizing a surcharge prevented a
fraud on the court." However, while debtors' fraudulent behavior is a
compelling reason to allow courts to issue a surcharge, which the

Scrivner court noted,' § 105(a) still requires the court to further a
substantive provision in the Code in order to use its equitable powers.
The principle that courts may not use § 105(a) to fashion new
rights or remedies is demonstrated by the laws regarding setoffs in
bankruptcy proceedings. A setoff is a nonbankruptcy right that allows

parties to exchange one debt for another. "' Setoffs are permitted in
bankruptcy proceedings pursuant to § 553(a) of the Code, which stipulates that creditors and debtors are not prevented from setting off mutual debts owed to each other provided the debts arose before the

commencement of the case. "° However, courts are not able to use their
equitable powers to create a right to setoff a debt.

134

11 USC § 105(a) (emphasis added). See Part I.C.

135

See Part lI.B.

See Part II.A. See also In re Ward, 210 BR 531, 538 (Bankr ED Va 1997) ("To allow a
debtor who has converted property of the estate to be paid his or her exemption without having
to account to the trustee by way of setoff for the value of the converted property strikes at the
very integrity of the bankruptcy process.").
137 Latman, 366 F3d at 785.
136

138

See Part II.B.

As Justice Antonin Scalia explained, "The right of setoff [ allows entities that owe each
other money to apply their mutual debts against each other, thereby avoiding the absurdity of
making A pay B when B owes A." Citizens Bank of Maryland v Strumpf,516 US 16,18 (1995).
140 The section of the Code governing setoff provides, in relevant part,
139

[Tihis title does not affect any right of a creditor to offset a mutual debt owing by such creditor to the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this title against a
claim of such creditor against the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case.
11 USC § 553(a). In order to set off debts under § 553, courts require three elements: (1) a prepetition debt owed by the creditor to the debtor; (2) a prepetition debt owed by the debtor to the
creditor; and (3) the debt and claim are mutual obligations. See In re Gould, 389 BR 105, 112
(Bankr ND Cal 2008).
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For example, in In Re NWFX,'' the Eighth Circuit held that
§ 105(a) does not provide courts with the right to issue an equitable
setoff."2 In NWFX, the debtor asked the bankruptcy court to issue a
setoff under § 553 of the Code, but the court refused because the parties lacked the required mutuality of debt. 3 However, the bankruptcy
court granted an "equitable setoff" by invoking its equitable powers
under § 105(a).'" The Eighth Circuit reversed the bankruptcy court's
ruling because the bankruptcy court had expanded its equitable powers beyond what the Code permits."5 The Eighth Circuit held that
§ 105(a) is a procedural instrument which does not delineate substantive rights upon the courts.'" Creating a right to issue an "equitable
setoff" is fashioning a substantive right, and it is therefore beyond the
powers set forth in the Code. "'
The concept of creating a right to setoff debts by using equitable
powers is similar to creating a right to surcharge assets by using equitable powers.' 8 Both would allow the creditor to exchange one debt for
another by relying solely on § 105(a).' 9 However, like an equitable
setoff, an equitable surcharge acts as a substantive right rather than a
procedural right. ° Since courts that authorize a surcharge use only
§ 105(a) and are not able to rely on a substantive bankruptcy provision that permits or requires the court to issue a surcharge, § 105(a)
functions substantively, as opposed to procedurally. Therefore, as the
Scrivner court's statutory interpretation and the setoff case law demonstrate, a court exceeds its power when it uses its equitable powers-either inherently as a court in equity or pursuant to § 105(a)-to
create a substantive right to surcharge a debtor's exempt assets.
To sum up, courts should not be able to use their § 105(a) powers
to surcharge a debtor's exempt assets to prevent the "fraud on the
141

864 F2d 593 (8th Cir 1989).

142

Id at 596.
Id at 595.

143

144 Id. Note the distinction between setoffs pursuant to § 553 (setoffs that satisfy the requirements of the statute) and setoffs pursuant to § 105(a) (setoffs that do not satisfy those
requirements, and thus solely rely on § 105(a)).
145 NWFX, 864 F2d at 596.

146
147

Id at 595.
Id at 596.

148 In fact, courts have even analyzed setoffs and surcharges in a similar fashion. For example, the court in In re Price, 384 BR 407 (Bankr ED Va 2008), held that the trustee may setoff the
debtor's exempt assets, or in the alternative, surcharge the exempt assets. Id at 410-12.
149 In the case of a surcharge, the creditor would be able to reach the debtor's exempt assets
to offset the value of nonexempt assets that the debtor failed to disclose or turnover.

150

See Part II.B.

151 See Part II.A.2.
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' that
bankruptcy court"52
Latman wanted to avoid. As the Tenth Circuit in Scrivner dictated, this practice of creating new rights or remedies expands a court's equitable powers beyond its limits. However,
there may be a way of remedying this type of injustice and deterring
its future use through a power already within the hands of bankruptcy
courts: the power of contempt.

B.

Courts Have Broad Rights through Their Powers of Contempt to
Sanction Parties Who Violate a Court Order
1.

A court's civil contempt power.

Courts are entitled to hold a party in contempt of court where
that party acted in bad faith or violated a court order.'" All courts
have contempt powers, including bankruptcy courts, and the courts
may use these powers to sanction violators with either civil or criminal
contempt of court." ' The courts' inherent contempt powers arise independent of statutory authority and are available for courts to use in
order to "achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases..'"
Courts may impose contempt sanctions for several reasons: to coerce
a party to obey a court order, to compensate a complainant who was
harmed by a party's failure to obey a court order, or to deter parties
from violating court orders in the future.'
Bankruptcy courts therefore may sanction a party in violation of
a court order to further the proceeding as a whole and to enforce the
provisions of the Code. However, while the courts are granted broad
discretionary power to determine the proper contempt sanctions, they
are not without their limits. For civil contempt, the sanction should be
remedial and compensatory, as opposed to criminal contempt, where
the sanction is meant to punish the violator.' The Fifth Circuit has
Latman, 366 F3d at 785.
See In re Dyer, 322 F3d 1178,1196 (9th Cir 2003).
154 See Jove Engineering,Inc v IRS, 92 F3d 1539, 1553 (11th Cir 1996). Courts have additionally held that bankruptcy courts are granted statutory contempt powers pursuant to § 105(a)
of the Bankruptcy Code. See id at 1554. These powers further enhance the bankruptcy court's
ability to hold a debtor in contempt in order to further the administration of the bankruptcy
case. See id at 1554.
155 See Chambers v NASCO, Inc, 501 US 32, 43 (1991) (discussing a federal court's contempt
powers). See also Jove Engineering,92 F3d at 1553 (discussing a bankruptcy court's contempt powers).
156 See Local 28, Sheet Metal Workers' InternationalAssociation v EEOC, 478 US 421, 443
(1986). See also In re GeneralMotors Corporation,61 F3d 256,258 (4th Cir 1995) (discussing the
purposes of a court's contempt powers).
157 See General Motors, 61 F3d at 259 (using civil contempt power to compensate defendant
after misconduct of plaintiffs counsel caused defendant to face lawsuits in other jurisdictions).
152
153

20091
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stated that compensatory sanctions "may not exceed the actual loss to
the complainant caused by the actions of respondent, lest the con-

tempt fine become punitive in nature, which is not appropriate in a
civil contempt proceeding.'''8

Where one party is harmed by another party's conduct in a court
proceeding, that party may motion the court to find the other in contempt of a court order. ' A party seeking to hold another in civil con-

tempt of court typically must demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that a violation occurred.'60 There are numerous tests used by
courts to determine whether a party in fact violated a court order, and
most courts only require a violation, without intent, in order to hold a

party in contempt. 6' However, some courts do require willful intent to
violate a court order in order to hold the violating party in contempt.' 62
2.

Distinguishing contempt powers from equitable powers.

A bankruptcy court's contempt powers are distinct from its
equitable powers under § 105(a). First, a court can only exercise its
contempt powers if a party violates an identifiable court order. However, it can use its equitable powers throughout the entire bankruptcy
proceeding, regardless of the debtor's conduct. 63'
Second, when a court uses its contempt powers, it is irrelevant
whether the order that was violated stems from the Bankruptcy Code
or nonbankruptcy law. Punishing for contempt is thus a nonbankruptcy right that is granted to judges whether they are bankruptcy judges
or nonbankruptcy judges. A court's equitable powers, on the other
hand, are exclusively a bankruptcy tool and only may be used to help
the court advance a specific provision of the Bankruptcy Code.
Third, a court's equitable powers and its contempt powers perform different functions, though they may at times overlap. A court
only employs its equitable powers to advance the provisions of the
NLRB v Laborers' InternationalUnion,882 F2d 949,955 (5th Cir 1980).
159 See FRBP 9020 (stating that the rule governing contested matters governs motions for
contempt made by the trustee or a party in interest).
160 See King v Allied Vision, 65 F3d 1051,1058 (2d Cir 1995).
161 See McComb v Jacksonville Paper Co, 336 US 187, 191 (1949). See also General Motors,
61 F3d at 258 ("Willfulness is not an element of civil contempt.").
162 See, for example, Jove Engineering,92 F3d at 1555. Although the definition of willfulness
varies, "willfulness generally connotes intentional action taken with at least callous indifference for
the consequence&" Sizzler Family Steak Houses v Western Sizzlin Steak House, Inc, 793 F2d 1529,
1535 (11th Cir 1986). These courts often use a general "willful violation" test to hold a party in
contempt. See Jove Engineering,92 F3d at 1555. This test requires that the offending party (1) knew
the order was issued and (2) intended the actions which violated the order. See id at 1555.
163 See Bessette v Avco FinancialServices Inc, 230 F3d 439,444-45 (1st Cir 2000).
158
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Bankruptcy Code.' A court's civil contempt powers, however, exist to
both further the bankruptcy proceeding as a whole and to compensate
a party who was harmed by virtue of another party's contemptuous
conduct.'5 Therefore, while a court's contempt powers only may be
used to sanction a party who violates a court order, they are far
broader in scope than the equitable powers; they are rights that courts
may use to enforce provisions of the Code, further the purposes of the
Code, enforce other state and federal laws, coerce a party to comply
with a court order, compensate a harmed party, or, in the6 case of criminal contempt, punish a party who violates a court order. 6
In Walls v Wells Fargo Bank,'67 the Ninth Circuit recognized this

distinction.'6 ' In Walls, the debtor argued that § 524 of the Bankruptcy
Code created a substantive right to a discharge injunction (meaning
the creditor could no longer pursue the debtor's debt), and that
§ 105(a) should be available to enforce the right where the creditor
violated the injunction. 69 The court, however, disagreed. ° It held that
§ 105(a) cannot be used to create substantive rights or remedies that
are not stipulated in the Code and that creating a private right of action to enforce §524 would be expanding the court's powers too far.M
However, the court held that it could use its civil contempt powers to
remedy the situation. 2 It explained that civil contempt is the typical
sanction for violations of § 524 and was a sufficient remedy in this case
because it is both compensatory and forces the creditor to abide by
the injunction. 3 Therefore, the court held that while a court's equitable powers under § 105(a) do not provide the debtor with the substantive right to remedy a discharge injunction, its civil contempt powers
could be used to provide a remedy. 174

See Part I.C.
See Part III.B.1.
166 See id.
164

165

276 F3d 502 (9th Cir 2001).
Id at 505 (examining a case where the debtor alleged that the creditor solicited and
collected monthly payments from the debtor after discharge).
169 Id at 506.
167

168

170
171

Id at 507.
Walls, 276 F3d at 507.

172 Id ("[C]ivil contempt is the normal sanction for violation of the discharge injunction...
civil contempt allows an aggrieved debtor to obtain compensatory damages ...[it] is the appropriate remedy and no further remedy is necessary.") (quotation marks omitted).
173 Id.

174

Id.
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3. Courts frequently use their contempt powers to issue sanctions for numerous types of violations.
Courts have used their contempt powers to fashion numerous
remedies where parties violate court mandates. As long as the sanction is remedial and compensatory, it is "within the court's broad discretion... 5 Several courts have used their contempt powers, as opposed to their equitable powers, to create a private right of action because it compensates the harmed party. For example, in Rodriguez v
Countrywide Home Loans,7' the court held that courts may use their

contempt powers to allow debtors to recover for the creditor's violation of bankruptcy provisions that do not separately provide the debtors with a private right of action." In Rodriguez, the creditor alleged
that the debtors' complaint, which sought relief for violations of the
orders for an automatic stay and a discharge injunction, should be
dismissed for failure to state a claim because these provisions do not
create a private right of action.'B However, the court differentiated the
plaintiffs' request that the court imply a private right of action for relief
from violations of orders." While the court recognized that it could not
use its equitable powers under § 105(a) to create a substantive right, it
asserted that it could use its statutory contempt powers to enforce a
provision of the Code."' In reaching its conclusion, the Rodriguez court
interpreted a court's contempt powers broadly. It held that while bankruptcy courts are not permitted to create new substantive rights, they
may use their contempt powers, when a party violates a court order, to
enforce substantive rights."' Therefore, the court used its contempt
powers to allow the debtors to obtain damages for violations of court
orders, as doing so enforced rights provided in the Bankruptcy Code.'1
A bankruptcy court has in fact used its contempt powers to sanction a debtor by surcharging his exempt assets for actions other than
fraudulent concealment of assets. In In re Swanson,"' the debtor
claimed $15,800 as exempt under § 522(d)."' The trustee sold the debtor's residence at an auction, and the court ordered the debtor to re175
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move his personal items and vacate the property. ' The debtor, however, continued to remain in his house. "6 A US Marshal eventually
removed the debtor and his personal property, causing the trustee to
incur a $10,000 administrative expense.'" The court found the debtor
in contempt of court and sanctioned him by permitting the trustee to
surcharge the debtor's exempt assets to pay for the additional administrative costs. ' While, as the court recognized, § 522(k) prevents a
trustee from surcharging a debtor's exempt assets for administrative
expenses, the court held that it could use its contempt power to surcharge the exempt assets as a sanction for violating the court order.'"
Additionally, courts have held that judges may take the value of
exempt assets into consideration when determining an appropriate
sanction for contempt. "° For example, in BKS Properties,Inc v Shumate,"' a bankruptcy court held the debtor in contempt for violating a
88
court order and sanctioned the debtor with a monetary judgment.'
The debtor failed to pay the judgment and appealed the sanction,
claiming he was unable to satisfy the monetary judgment.98 In assessing whether the debtor was capable of paying the issued sanction, the
court took into account the value of the debtor's house, even though it
was exempt property.'9 The court recognized that "[w]hile his house
may be exempt from collection actions taken by his creditors, [the
debtor] has the right, and the ability, to use the equity in his house to
purge his contempt."'8 ' These cases therefore demonstrate the broad
discretion that bankruptcy judges have in how and when they may
exercise their contempt powers.
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188 Id at 80-81 (analogizing the situation to one where the principle of setoff provides an
appropriate remedy, and thereby finding that the debtor was obligated to the trustee in the
amount of damages incurred due to its contempt).
189 Id at 81.
190 See SEC v AMX, International, Inc, 7 F3d 71, 76 (5th Cir 1993) (allowing defendant's
home to be considered by the court in determining whether he is financially able to pay the
disgorgement order); BKS Properties,Inc v Shumate, 271 BR 794, 803 (ND Tex 2002) (holding
that the exempted value of a debtor's home could not be considered in bankruptcy, but could be
considered in the context of a contempt order).
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C. Surcharging a Debtor's Exempt Assets Should Therefore Be
within the Court's Contempt Powers
In a bankruptcy proceeding, if a debtor fails to comply with a rule
or a court order, there are several avenues that the court may pursue.
Depending on the debtor's violation, the court may be entitled to deny that debtor a discharge under §727, issue a turnover order under
§ 542, dismiss the case pursuant to § 707, or fashion another remedy
by using its equitable powers to further another provision of the
Code.' Additionally, the court may be able to hold that debtor in contempt for disobeying a court order and consequently use its broad
discretionary contempt powers to sanction the debtor.
The courts that have used their equitable powers under § 105(a)
to create a right to surcharge a debtor's exempt assets, where that debtor failed to disclose or turnover nonexempt property, have overstepped their boundaries. This was recognized by the two most recent
courts to confront the situation. ' 9 However, while the Scrivner court
asserted that only the legislature could rectify this loophole in the
bankruptcy code, the courts have another option in these situations. If
the debtor in fact violated a court order by unlawfully concealing
property that it was supposed to disclose or by failing to turn over
property or assets as required, courts may hold the debtor in civil contempt. Bankruptcy courts may thereafter fashion a remedy that is appropriate to compensate the creditor who is harmed by the debtor's
actions and additionally to coerce the debtor to obey the order. In a
case where a debtor fails to turn over or disclose nonexempt property,
but simultaneously maintains the entire value of his permitted exemptions, and where the creditors are no longer able to reach the nonexempt assets, a court should be permitted to enter an order of contempt against that debtor and issue a surcharge of his exempt property.
1. Justifications for allowing courts to issue a surcharge of exempt property as a sanction for civil contempt.
There are several rationales for allowing a court to reach a debtor's exempt assets where that debtor willfully violated a court order
to disclose or turn over estate property. First, it will compensate the
aggrieved creditor who was harmed by the debtor's failure to properly
comply with the bankruptcy process. Case law indicates that one of
the main purposes of civil contempt is to provide compensation to a
196
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complainant for the violator's harmful conduct."' In these cases, if the
debtor is permitted to keep the full value of his exemptions as well as
the value of the improperly retained assets, the debtor benefits from
property that is rightfully the creditor's. The Tenth Circuit in fact recognized this in Scrivner and claimed that "[a]llowing the debtors to
keep the full value of their exempt assets, when they have kept or
converted assets belonging to the estate, arguably gives the debtors an
undeserved benefit at the expense of the estate and the creditors."'9
While denying a discharge of debt or dismissing the bankruptcy
suit may punish the debtor, doing so will not compensate a creditor if
the debtor is otherwise insolvent or refuses to pay his debts.2 M The
creditor's claim will survive the bankruptcy proceeding in these situations, but the creditor will likely still have difficulty collecting the debt.
For example, if the debtor acted fraudulently during the course of the
bankruptcy proceeding, such as concealing estate property or refusing
to turn over assets, the debtor may act fraudulently in a suit outside of
bankruptcy as well. Additionally, initiating another suit that is outside
of bankruptcy will impose increased costs on creditors. The creditors
will no longer have a trustee responsible for collecting debt from the
debtor; they will be forced to spend time initiating and pursuing a new
suit in court, and they will have to pay the additional costs associated
with a new lawsuit. Also, if the case goes to trial, a jury may be required to determine the proper damages, which is even more timeconsuming and expensive. ' Bankruptcy proceedings, however, are
courts in equity, and judges are able to execute the case without a jury.
Second, if a creditor's claim against the debtor survives bankruptcy, it may be very difficult, expensive, and time-consuming to collect,
and this particularly affects small and less established creditors. Considering that the proceedings in these cases apply to individuals, rather
than corporations, their creditors may frequently be smaller creditors
rather than large, institutional creditors with the resources to easily
pursue a debt outside of bankruptcy. In practice, many of these creditors will probably not be able to recover their debts. °2 Therefore, while
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199535 F3d at 1263.
200 See Latman, 366 F3d at 782 (noting that a denial of discharge is a punitive sanction
meant to punish debtors for misconduct in the process).
201 See, for example, In re We Care Products,Inc, 1996 WL 762326, *9 (Bankr DDC).
202 For example, the trustee in Latman motioned the court for a surcharge in order to recover $7,000. 366 F3d at 779. In order to recover this without a surcharge, the creditors would
have to bring suit outside of bankruptcy without the help of a trustee. This is a relatively small

2009]

Approaching the Limits of the Bankruptcy Code

1775

denying a discharge or dismissing a case are powerful punitive sanctions that courts may use against debtors, they do little to compensate
the creditors harmed by the situation. Alternatively, allowing creditors
to recover the value of the hidden property by reaching the debtor's
exempt assets provides compensation to the wronged creditor where
other remedies provided in the Code do not.
Third, sanctioning debtors by allowing creditors to reach their exempt assets coerces the debtor to surrender the value of the concealed
assets. As the Supreme Court recognized in Local 28, Sheet Metal
Workers' InternationalAssociation v EEOC, 3 one of the courts' main
goals in issuing a contempt sanction is to coerce a party to obey a court
order.. By surcharging the debtor's exempt assets for the value of the
undisclosed nonexempt assets, the courts would be in effect forcing the
debtor to obey the original order that either required the debtor to disclose all of his assets or to turn over all of his nonexempt assets.
Fourth, permitting creditors to surcharge a debtor's exempt assets
further deters debtors from attempting to conceal, keep, or furtively
transfer assets. If debtors are aware ex ante that the court can sanction
the debtor by deducting the value of undisclosed assets from their permitted exemptions, then debtors may be less likely to attempt to improperly conceal or keep their nonexempt assets. However, i, as the
Scrivner court mentioned, courts may not reach these nonexempt assets
or surcharge the debtor's exempt assets, debtors may be incentivized to
attempt to conceal and dissipate nonexempt assets in the future.
While denying a discharge may also deter debtors from fraudulently concealing assets in most cases, there might be situations where
surcharging the debtor's exempt assets would act as a greater deterrent
than denying discharge. For example, if a debtor knows that his creditor
would be unable to collect his debt, might soon go out of business, or
would not discover undisclosed assets in time to stop the debtor from
exhausting valuable estate property, then a denial of discharge might
not concern the debtor. However, if the debtor is aware that the court
would allow the creditor to reach his exempt assets as a consequence
for hiding or refusing to turn over assets, then that creditor would have
a greater incentive to comply with the court orders. Therefore, allowing
courts to sanction debtors in contempt of court by reaching their examount of recovery and it may not make sense for these creditors to pursue it after the bankruptcy proceeding.
203
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empt assets would deter the debtor from disobeying a court order, and
would thus protect both creditors and court resources in the future.
Finally, allowing courts to issue sanctions where a debtor improperly conceals or retains nonexempt property provides legitimacy to
the bankruptcy process. The bankruptcy system is based on the dual
goals of providing debtors with a fresh start as well as distributing existing assets to creditors. If the public begins to doubt the reliability of
the bankruptcy system, or if the system indicates a preference for debtors' rights over creditors', our system may suffer as a result. For example, if creditors fear that our bankruptcy system is weak or that it
provides preferential treatment to individual debtors, they may be
more hesitant to provide loans or financing to specific groups of individuals, particularly to vulnerable people in need of them.205
2. Allowing a surcharge does not conflict with the purposes or
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.
Allowing courts to reach a debtor's exempt assets as a consequence of disobeying a court order does not, as the Scrivner court
claimed,"' violate other provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. The purpose of individual bankruptcies is to provide a fresh start to the "honest but unfortunate debtor."' Exemption statutes are designed to further this purpose and allow debtors to proceed, after bankruptcy, unrestrained by their debt and with a sufficient quality of life. However,
the Code is not fashioned to protect the dishonest debtor. By filing for
bankruptcy, a debtor has acknowledged his troubled situation and
asked the court system for assistance. The bankruptcy process is designed to assist both debtors and creditors, but the bankruptcy proceeding is contingent on the parties obeying court orders and acting in
good faith. For example, in Taylor, the Supreme Court specifically
noted that it must enforce the time limits contained in §522(1) where
the exemption list is "claimed in good faith." The Court's inclusion of
the words "good faith" indicates that courts may only be required to
enforce § 522(1) where the debtor claims exemptions in good faith, not
where the debtor dishonestly claims exemptions and continues to con205 See Christopher W. Frost, Bankruptcy Redistributive Policies and the Limits of the Judicial Process, 74 NC L Rev 75, 116-17 (1995) (explaining that a bankruptcy system that favors
redistribution at the expense of efficiency would be borne heavily by the riskiest debtors who
would no longer receive loans).
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ceal nonexempt assets, knowing they are retaining more value than
their exemption statutes permit.
Additionally, allowing courts to surcharge a debtor's exempt assets as a sanction for contempt does not reduce the value of that debtor's retained assets below his permitted exemptions-the surcharge
therefore would not violate exemption statutes, regardless of whether
federal or state law governs. For example, suppose a debtor is entitled
to retain $100 worth of exempt assets. After filing for bankruptcy, the
debtor additionally uses $50 of nonexempt assets that he concealed in
an undisclosed account. If the court surcharges the debtor's exempt
assets to account for that $50, the debtor would still have received the
full value permitted in the exemption statute after filing ($100). The
court is simply preventing the debtor from keeping more than is he is
allowed; the extra $50 rightfully belongs to the creditors. The surcharge thus compensates the creditor while still providing the debtor
with the full value of permitted exemptions. Therefore, it furthers the
Bankruptcy Code's purpose of collecting debt without restricting the
debtor's ability to gain a fresh start.
Finally, as case law relating to other provisions of the Code demonstrates, a court does not necessarily defy the Code's boundaries
by reaching property that the debtor claimed as exempt. First, in the
setoff cases,2 the majority of courts allow creditors to setoff a debt,
pursuant to § 553 of the Code, by acquiring the value of their debt
from the debtor's exempt assets."' The courts recognize that this does
not violate § 522(1) of the Code because the creditors had a right to
the value of the debt before the debtor filed the list of exemptions,
and the property was therefore not property of the estate. Additionally, courts may take exempt assets into consideration when sanctioning
a debtor for contempt."' In Swanson,"' the court in fact permitted the
trustee to surcharge the debtor's exempt assets to account for the administrative expenses incurred as a result of the debtor's contemptuous conduct." ' Therefore, since § 522(1) may only apply to exemption
lists filed in good faith, and because courts have allowed creditors to
use their contempt powers to reach exempt assets in particular situations, courts will not breach the Code by sanctioning debtors with a
See Part III.A.2 for a discussion of setoffs in bankruptcy.
See, for example, IRS v Luongo, 259 F3d 323, 336 (5th Cir 2001) (holding that a setoff,
which reaches property that would otherwise be exempt under applicable law, does not violate
§ 522 of the Code); Gould, 389 BR at 120 (same).
211 See Part IIt.B.3.
212 207 BR at 80-81.
213 See Part II.B.3.
209
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surcharge on their exempt assets if the debtors still receive the full
value of their permitted exemptions.
3. Limitations on the court's ability to surcharge exempt assets.
The courts that currently allow a creditor to surcharge a debtor's exempt assets do not follow a specific standard regarding when to surcharge the assets. For example, in Latman, the Ninth Circuit held that
courts may use their equitable powers under § 105(a) to surcharge a debtor's exempt assets only in "exceptional circumstances. 2 .. However, the
court failed to provide any further guidance to direct the courts. This
Comment asserts that courts, in order to sanction a debtor by reaching
his exempt assets, should be required to find that: (1) the debtor willfully
violated a court order; (2) the debtor, after filing for bankruptcy, retained
the full value of his permitted exemptions plus the undisclosed or improperly retained assets; and (3) the trustee was unable to reach the improperly retained estate property. By satisfying these minimum requirements, a court would recognize the limits of its contempt powers while
simultaneously performing a remedial act in an equitable manner.
First, in order to surcharge a debtor's exempt assets, the court
must find the debtor in contempt of a court order. " While courts impose various standards regarding a finding of contempt, with some offenses requiring knowledge and most others simply requiring a violation, ' a willful violation test is more appropriate in these situations.
Withdrawing assets from a debtor's exempt property is prohibited by
the Code when the debtor creates the exemption list in good faith."7
Therefore, in order to reach those exempt assets, the court should require proof that the debtor did not act in good faith-this entails proving that the debtor engaged in a knowledgeable violation of the court
order to disclose or turn over estate property. The trustee should bear
the burden of proving to the court, with clear and convincing evidence,
that the debtor willfully violated the court order. ' To satisfy this requirement, the trustee must first prove that the debtor knew that the
court issued an order to either disclose or turn over nonexempt proper214 366 F3d at 786 ("Under exceptional circumstances, such as those presented here, surcharge may be the only means fairly to ensure that debtors retain their statutory 'fresh start,'
while also permitting creditors access to property in excess of that which is properly exempted
under the Bankruptcy Code.").
215 Otherwise, the court would be creating a substantive right to surcharge which, as previously discussed, is beyond a court's power.
216 See Part III.B.1.
217
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ty. If the court finds that the debtor was aware of the court order, then
the trustee also must prove that the debtor intentionally violated that
order by concealing or failing to turn over the property.
If the court finds the debtor in contempt of a court order, then it
should ensure that, at the time debtor filed for bankruptcy, he retained
the full value of his exemption list in addition to the undisclosed assets. By requiring this element, the court can verify that the debtor
retained his full statutory allowance and that the surcharge would
simply prevent him from keeping more than his permitted exemptions.
Otherwise, seizing money from a debtor's exemptions would violate
both § 522 of the Code, which provides debtors with the right to exempt a certain amount of assets from their bankruptcy estate, and the
idea of providing the debtor with a "fresh start....9
Finally, the trustee should be required to prove to the court that
he is not able to acquire the estate property in question. This surcharging remedy is meant to compensate an aggrieved creditor, and creditors should not be able to recover assets or the value of assets from a
debtor's exempt property if the creditor is able to reach the nonexempt
estate property. Otherwise, a creditor may attempt to use this remedy to
circumvent the Code's provisions to acquire assets or cash that it otherwise would not be entitled to. For instance, if an automobile should be
included in the estate, but the creditor would prefer to obtain an exempt piece of jewelry worth the same amount, the creditor should not
be able to use this sanction to acquire the jewelry-the creditor should
only be able to obtain the jewelry if he cannot recover the car. Therefore, before the court should sanction a debtor by surcharging his exempt property, the creditor should be obligated to prove to the court
that it was not able to reach the nonexempt estate property.
CONCLUSION

In order to properly regulate bankruptcy proceedings while simultaneously providing debtors with a fresh start and fostering debt
collection, bankruptcy courts must be authorized to enforce the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. Congress recognized this necessity and
provided the courts with a statutory grant of equitable power in
§ 105(a) of the Code. However, courts may not use these powers to
create substantive rights and remedies, as § 105(a) is a procedural instrument meant to further specific provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.
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Courts therefore exceed their equitable powers by creating a substantive right to surcharge a debtor's exempt assets.
This Comment suggests, however, that if a debtor fraudulently
conceals or refuses to turn over estate property, and the creditor is
unable to subsequently reach the property, the court should be able to
nonetheless force the debtor to give up his ill-gotten gains through its
power of contempt and sanction him by surcharging his exempt assets
for the value of the improperly retained property. As long as this contempt power is properly limited to only those circumstances where
there is a willful violation, the debtor still receives the full value of his
permitted exemptions, and the creditors are unable to reach the nonexempt assets, we should expect that courts like Latman, Scrivner,and
Mazon will be able to incent the proper behavior by debtors without
improperly utilizing § 105(a). This remedy allows the court to compensate the creditor, forces the debtor to obey the court order, and deters
debtors from attempting to conceal or improperly retain estate property, while at the same time protecting and furthering the substantive
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.

